Documentation of a Model Action Plan to Deter Illicit Nuclear Trafficking by Smith, D. et al.
UCRL-CONF-223251
Documentation of a Model Action
Plan to Deter Illicit Nuclear
Trafficking
D.K. Smith, M.J. Kristo, S. Niemeyer, G.B. Dudder
July 28, 2006
Methods and Applications of Radioanalytical Chemistry -
MARC VII
Kona, HI, United States
April 2, 2006 through April 7, 2006
Disclaimer 
 
 This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States 
Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their 
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process 
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any 
specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, 
does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United 
States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein 
do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, 
and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 
 
1Log Number: 194
Documentation of a model action plan to deter illicit nuclear trafficking
D.K. Smith
smith24@llnl.gov
M.J. Kristo
kristo2@llnl.gov
S. Niemeyer
niemeyer1@llnl.gov
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA  94550  USA
G.B. Dudder
gordon.dudder@pnl.gov
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA  99352  USA
Key words: nuclear trafficking, nuclear attribution, nuclear forensics
2Documentation of a model action plan to deter illicit nuclear trafficking
D.K. Smith, M.J. Kristo, S.Niemeyer
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA  94550  USA
G.B. Dudder
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA  99352  USA
Theft, illegal possession, smuggling, or attempted unauthorized sale of nuclear 
and radiological materials remains a worldwide problem.  The Nuclear Smuggling 
International Technical Working Group (ITWG) has adopted a model action plan to 
guide investigation of these cases through a systematic approach to nuclear forensics.  
The model action plan was recently documented and provides recommendations 
concerning incident response, collection of evidence in conformance with required legal 
standards, laboratory sampling and distribution of samples, radioactive materials analysis, 
including categorization and characterization of samples, forensics analysis of 
conventional evidence, and case development including interpretation of forensic 
signatures.  
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear forensics and nuclear attribution have become increasingly important 
tools in the fight against illegal trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials. As 
trafficking of these materials has increased during the last decade, so has the need to 
develop tools and procedures that allow insight into the movement of contraband and 
those involved in these illegal activities.  Nuclear forensics and attribution is an emerging 
cross-disciplinary science that combines elements of nuclear and radiochemistry, 
3analytical chemistry, materials science, nuclear physics, nuclear engineering, and 
environmental science.  While recent publications have begun to describe this field, less 
attention has been focused on developing an accepted, systematic approach to nuclear 
forensic and attribution investigation 1, 2.  Absent such an approach, the international 
community, including law enforcement, first responders, and governmental policy 
makers, have requested assistance in the development of reliable, accepted procedures for 
responding to incidents involving the interdiction of nuclear and radiological materials.  
This paper is a summary of a larger technical report delivered to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency as a framework for international nuclear forensics support 3, 4.
EXPERIMENTAL
Definitions
Nuclear attribution is a process to identify the source of nuclear or radioactive 
materials used in illegal activities; to determine the point-of-origin and routes of transit 
involving contraband materials, and to ultimately contribute to the successful prosecution 
of those responsible.  Inputs essential to nuclear attribution include 1) results from 
nuclear and traditional forensic analyses, 2) scientific understanding of radiochemical and 
environmental signatures, 3) knowledge of the methods of production of nuclear 
materials, the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, and the nuclear weapons development pathway, 
and 4) information from law enforcement and intelligence sources.  Through fusion of all 
relevant forms of information pertaining to  nuclear trafficking; attribution enables data to 
be readily accessed, analyzed, and interpreted to formulate an appropriate law 
enforcement or national security response.
4Nuclear forensics is the analysis of interdicted illicit nuclear or radioactive 
materials and any associated materials to provide evidence for nuclear attribution.  
Potential signatures may include isotopic, chemical, morphological, or physical 
signatures from the nuclear or radiological materials, as well as traditional forensic 
signatures including fingerprints, DNA, explosive residues, hair, fibers, and pollen.  The 
goal of nuclear analysis is to identify forensic indicators in the samples or the allied 
environment, e.g. containers or packaging.  These indicators arise from known 
relationships between materials characteristics and process history.  For this reason, 
nuclear forensics is dependent upon a detailed understanding of the nuclear fuel cycle and 
the associated signatures that accompany concentration, enrichment, fabrication, and 
irradiation history of nuclear and radiological materials.
Sources of nuclear and radioactive materials
Nuclear materials can be categorized as:  special nuclear materials (SNM), reactor 
fuel, and commercial radioactive sources (see Table 1).
SNM makes an especially attractive target for nations and terrorist organizations 
intent on developing a nuclear weapon, because possession of sufficient amounts of SNM 
eliminates the necessity of developing the advanced technology required for isotopic 
enrichment of uranium or plutonium separation. Radioactive isotopes are useful sources 
of radioactivity for medical diagnostics and therapy, non-destructive analysis of 
materials, sterilization of medical equipment and food, and generation of electricity in 
remote locations. The significant level of radioactivity in many commercial radioactive 
5sources and spent reactor fuel makes them attractive components of a radiological 
dispersal device (RDD) or so called “dirty bomb”.
Nuclear trafficking and the emerging nature of the problem
The International Atomic Energy Agency has maintained an Illicit Trafficking 
Database (ITDB) on cases of unauthorized use, transport, and possession of nuclear and 
radioactive materials since 1995.  There has been a significant increase in the number of 
reported nuclear smuggling cases since 1991.  Between 1995 and the end of 2004, more 
than 650 illicit trafficking incidents have been confirmed by 82 participating member 
states.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have focused world attention on 
terrorist groups, their aims, and their methods. Although it is difficult to predict the future 
course of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials; increasingly, these 
incidents are viewed as significant threats that merit the development of national and 
international forensic and attribution response capabilities.
International cooperation
Many international forensics laboratories are already cooperating to develop 
common technical strategies and databases that catalogue nuclear processes for use in 
nuclear attribution.  The Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group 
(ITWG) was formed in 1995 to foster international cooperation in combating illicit 
trafficking of nuclear materials.  More than 28 nations and organizations have 
participated in ten international meetings and two round-robin analytical trials to-date 5.  
In 2004 the ITWG Nuclear Forensics Laboratories (INFL) was established to develop 
6accepted and common protocols for the collection of evidence and laboratory 
investigations, prioritize techniques and methods for forensic analyses for nuclear and 
non nuclear samples, inter-laboratory forensic exercises, and development of forensic 
databanks to assist in interpretation, and to provide technical assistance for requesting 
countries.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Nuclear forensic model action plan
A graded level of response is appropriate following both the notification or 
detection of an undeclared and suspect radioactive source, and the initial response and 
evaluation by first responders.
1) An operational response by first responders where there is no health hazard, no 
security implications, and no proliferation threat;
2) A tactical response required by more serious cases where a health hazard is identified 
or a criminal act is suspected;
3) A strategic response calls on the activation of a district or national emergency response 
plan because of a significant potential hazard to the environment or public.
Nuclear forensic investigations begin immediately following the interdiction of a 
suspect radioactive source.  It is particularly important when there is an indication of 
possible criminal activity. Because nuclear forensics is focused on developing 
information necessary to respond to acts of trafficking, the forensic investigations are 
required to answer specific questions raised by law enforcement.  Nuclear forensic 
investigations must be conducted consistent with the following requirements:
1. Law enforcement authorities secure the site of the interdiction.
72. Trained and equipped first responders confirm the nuclear or radioactive nature of the 
material and determine whether a potential nuclear or radiological hazard exists.
3. The lead agency is notified to initiate the action plan.
4. At the scene where the nuclear or radioactive materials are discovered
· A health physics examination is required to determine the occupational and public 
radiation hazard.
· Law enforcement response to check for hidden explosives and preservation of 
evidence, including initiation of chain-of-custody procedures in conformance with 
the rules of evidence.
· On-site categorization of seized material using mobile non-destructive analysis.
· Secure and safe storage of evidence before transport to the nuclear forensics 
laboratory.
5. At the specialized national nuclear forensics laboratory:
· Further examination of the sample material for hidden explosives before 
unpacking.
· Preservation of nuclear forensic evidence and classical forensic analysis of non-
radioactive material.
· Detailed investigation contingent upon the laboratory’s capabilities (e.g., visual, 
physical characterization, sub-sampling, analysis of chemical, isotopic and 
morphological properties).
· Data interpretation from the specialized nuclear forensics laboratory should 
elucidate the processes used to create or manufacture the material. From this 
interpretation, attribution of the origin of the material is possible.
86. If the national nuclear forensics laboratory does not have the necessary capabilities 
for the required analysis, that sample may be shipped to an appropriately equipped 
nuclear forensics laboratory such as one affiliated with the INFL.
7. Analytical results are compared with an appropriate nuclear forensics database, 
possibly resulting in further investigations.
8. An analytical “expert opinion” of the analyzed seized material is drafted for the 
national law enforcement authorities.  A nuclear forensics examiner should help 
prepare the expert opinion.
9. A national legal authority – through a lead federal agency - evaluates all the evidence. 
10. If the evidence can support a prosecution, the national legal authority may file 
criminal charges.
11. At the conclusion of the litigation, a competent authority will arrange for the final 
disposition of the seized material.
In this paper, the above measures are grouped and discussed in four categories.  
(Incident response and nuclear forensics laboratory sampling and distribution are also 
necessary elements but are not described further in this paper 3,4.) 
· Nuclear forensic analysis
· Traditional forensic analysis
· Nuclear forensic interpretation
· Knowledge bases
Nuclear forensic analysis
Nuclear forensics does not lend itself to routine procedures that can be universally 
applied to all evidence.  Rather, it involves an iterative approach, in which the results 
9from one analysis are used to guide the selection of subsequent analyses.  In this way, 
radioactive materials analysis applied to nuclear forensics proceed in a manner not unlike 
that of traditional forensic analysis.  It is important to emphasize that all sampling and 
analysis must be performed with strict attention to procedures for both the preservation of 
evidence and maintaining the chain-of-custody.  The sampling process can equally 
extract and obliterate evidence.  Many of the analytical tools used in radioactive materials 
analysis are destructive in that they may consume some amount of a sample during 
analysis.  The proper selection and sequencing of analyses is critical in preventing the 
possible destruction of evidence.  
The nuclear forensic examiner has a wide array of analytical tools to use for 
detecting signatures in radioactive material. These individual techniques can be sorted 
into three broad categories: bulk analysis tools, imaging tools, and microanalysis tools.  
Bulk analysis tools, including inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry and x-ray 
fluorescence analysis allow the forensic scientist to characterize the elemental and 
isotopic composition of the radioactive material as a whole.  Imaging tools consist of 
optical, scanning, and transmission electron microscopy that provide high magnification 
images or maps of the material which can also confirm sample homogeneity or 
heterogeneity. If imaging analysis confirms that the sample is heterogeneous, then 
microanalysis tools, including electron beam energy dispersive analysis can 
quantitatively or semi-quantitatively characterize the individual constituents of the bulk 
material. 
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Table II shows the generally accepted sequence of analysis, prioritized into 
techniques that should be performed within 24 hours, one week, or two months from 
arrival at the nuclear forensics laboratory.
Traditional forensic analysis
Traditional forensic analysis, like radioactive materials analysis, can be an 
iterative process, in which the results from one analysis are used to guide the selection of 
subsequent analyses. Unlikely and apparently unrelated evidence often are key to the 
successful prosecution of a case.  Once again, all sampling and analysis must be in 
conformance with procedures for the preservation of evidence and chain of custody.  The 
sampling process could contaminate or destroy some evidence while pursuing other 
evidence. The collection of traditional forensic evidence on radioactively contaminated 
materials must also be performed in a manner consistent with sound radiological safety 
practices.
The variety of traditional forensic evidence, as well as the methods of collection 
and evaluation, is almost limitless.  For example, evidence such as tissue, hair, 
fingerprints, and shoeprints can often associate a specific individual with a specific place 
or object. The analysis of fibers, pollen, or chemical substances found at the incident 
scene can provide information about motives or transportation routes. Documentary 
evidence provides useful information not only in the content of the communication itself, 
but also in the incidental details of its creation (paper, ink, film type, extraneous noises, 
accents).
In keeping with the described procedures for collection of radioactive evidence, 
the international community has also agreed upon a common sequence for traditional 
11
evidence collection. Table II shows that the collection of fingerprint and fiber evidence 
should occur within the first 24 hours after sample receipt. The chemical analysis of other 
evidence by techniques, such as gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS), may 
occur up to two months after the recovery of evidence.  Priority should be given to the 
collection of more individualized signatures (DNA or hair) or those more sensitive to 
environmental degradation (HEU residue).
Nuclear forensic interpretation
Signatures are unique physical, chemical, elemental, and isotopic characteristics 
that distinguish a given nuclear or radiological material. These signatures enable the 
identification of the processes that created the material, aspects of the subsequent history 
of the material, and potentially the locations where the material originated.  Two 
important approaches to delineating signatures are: 1) discovery using an empirical 
approach through the systematic analysis of nuclear and radiological materials, and 2) 
modeling based on the chemistry and physics of nuclear processes. 
Physical characteristics of the material include the texture, size, and shape of solid 
objects and the particle size distribution of powder samples. For example, the dimensions 
of a fresh nuclear fuel pellet are often unique to a given manufacturer.  The morphology 
of the uranium oxide particles comprising a fuel pellet, including inclusions or 
occlusions, can be indicative of the manufacturing process.
Chemical characteristics of the material include the exact chemical composition 
of the material or the association of unique molecular components. For example, uranium 
oxide can be found in many different forms, e.g., UO2, U3O8, or UO3, each of which can 
be found at various points in the uranium fuel cycle. The association of some organic 
12
compounds, such as certain light kerosene oils or tributyl phosphate, with the nuclear 
material can be indicative of a reprocessing operation.
Elemental signatures of the material include the determination of major, minor, 
and trace elements in the material.  Major elements help define the identity of the nuclear 
material, but minor elements, such as erbium or gadolinium that serve as burnable reactor 
fuel poisons or gallium that serves as a phase stabilizer for plutonium metal, also help 
define its origin. Trace elements can also prove to be indicative of a process, e.g., Fe and 
Cr residues from stainless steel tooling or Ca, Mg, or Cl residues from a water-based 
cleaning process.
Isotopic signatures of the material include fission or neutron-capture products 
indicative of irradiation in a nuclear reactor.  The isotopes provide insight into reactor 
type and operating conditions. Other isotopes are decay products.  For example, 230Th is a 
decay product of 234U and 235U is a decay product of 239Pu.  Because radioactive isotopes 
decay at a rate determined by the half-life of the parent isotope, the relative amounts of 
decay products and parent isotopes can be used to determine the “age” of the material 
(i.e., the time since the parent isotope was last chemically separated from its decay 
products). 
Knowledge bases of nuclear processes
Knowledge bases of nuclear processes and nuclear forensic data are necessary for 
effective interpretation of the production methods, point of origin, and transit of nuclear 
materials throughout the world.  The ability to compare signatures with existing 
knowledge and data is central to the interpretation process.  Open as well as proprietary 
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knowledge bases are presently maintained by a variety of international, national, and non-
governmental entities. Current efforts are underway to develop and organize databases to 
specifically catalogue nuclear processes for use in nuclear forensics.
Comparative analyses between interdicted material and archived samples are 
imperative. These analyses allow the nuclear forensic expert to establish connections 
between the interdicted material and archived material or between the processes used to 
create them.  Sample archives can include “real world” nuclear forensic samples, reactor 
fuel stock, other nuclear materials, and industrial radiological sources.
CONCLUSIONS
A documented model action plan provides guidance to requesting governments 
and response organizations on nuclear forensic analysis, traditional forensic analysis, 
nuclear forensic interpretation, and knowledge bases to conduct a nuclear forensic 
investigation.  The sharing of a comprehensive international plan for nuclear forensics is 
essential to deter illicit trafficking.
Work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by the University 
of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48.
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Table I.  Categories of nuclear materials
SNM
IAEA Categories Characteristics
High Enriched Uranium (HEU) >20% U-235
-- Weapons-Grade Uranium (WGU) Pure uranium metal
>93% U-235
Weapons-Grade Plutonium (WGPu) Pure plutonium metal
<7% Pu-240
-- Super-Grade Plutonium (SGPu) Pure plutonium metal
<3% Pu-240
Reactor Fuel
IAEA Categories Characteristics
Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) <20% (typically 3-5%) U-235
Reactor-Grade Plutonium (RGPu) Produced in nuclear power reactors
>19% Pu-240
Fuel-Grade Plutonium (FGPu) Produced in nuclear reactors
>7% and <19% Pu-240
MOX-grade Plutonium (MGPu) Recycled from mixed (uranium + plutonium) 
oxide fuel
>30% Pu-240
Radioactive Sources
Typical Uses Common Constituents
Medical Diagnostic Sources Short-lived radioisotopes
Radiotherapy Sources Co-60 and Cs-137
Irradiators/Sterilizers Co-60 and Cs-137
Radiography/NDT Ir-192
Gauging Co-60, Cs-137, Am-241
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG) Pu-238, Cm-244, and Sr-90
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Table II. Suggested sequence for laboratory techniques and methods
Techniques/Methods 24-Hour One Week Two Months
Radiological Estimated total activity
Dose rate (a, b, g, n)
Surface contamination
Physical
Characterization
Visual inspection
Radiography
Photography
Weight
Dimensions
Optical microscopy
Density
SEM/EDS
XRD
TEM (EDX)
Traditional Forensic
Analysis
Fingerprints, Fibers
Isotope Analysis g-spectroscopy
a-spectroscopy
Mass spectrometry
(SIMS, TIMS,
ICP-MS)
Radiochemical
separations
Elemental/Chemical ICP-MS
XRF
Assay (titration, IDMS)
GC/MS
SEM/EDS= Scanning Electron Microanalysis with Energy Dispersive Sensor
TEM= Transmission Electron Microscopy
SIMS= Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry
TIMS= Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry
ICP-MS= Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry
XRF= X-ray Fluorescence Analysis
IDMS= Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry
GC/MS= Gas Chromatography / Mass Spectrometry
